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Abstract 
Various literature have discussed about various influences of corporate governance elements in firm 
performance The general  assessment is corporate governance act as an instrument to support 
management's to achieve its desired goals with the stakeholder value especially in increase financial 
performance.Despite the broad studies  of corporate governance there is still a different argument in the 
view of the influence of corporate governance on financial performance. Therefore, the aim of this paper 
is to identify the influence of two corporate governance variables on  firm performance. The corporate 
governance measurement was measured by the  Independent non executive director and audit committee 
as independent variables and firm performance is measured by  return on equity (ROE) and earnings per 
share (EPS) as dependent variables. This study is purely quantitative whereby data were collected from 
secondary source such as published in journals and Annual Reports of the companies. This study 
discovered that, there is a significant influence of corporate governance on firm performance. Therefore, 
the results show that good corporate governance practiceinfluence firm performance. Finally, it's hoped 
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that this study provides current corporate governance set-up in Malaysia that can be used to improve the 
development of corporate governance. 
Key words: Audit committee, Corporate Governance, Firm Performance and Independent non-
executive directors. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the well-publicized corporate scandals such as Enron, 
Worldcom and Parmalat have highlighted the importance of good corporate governance practices for the 
long-term survival of companies. The accountability and transparency component of corporate 
governance would help companies gain shareholders’ and investors’ trust. The stakeholders need 
assurance that the company will be run both honestly and effectively. This is where corporate governance 
is critical (Morck&Steier, 2005), because it can improve stakeholders’ confidence and sustainability of 
business in the long run. 
Moreover, effective corporate governance reduces “control rights” shareholders and creditors 
bestow on managers, in increasing the probability of the firm, and managers are expected to invest in a 
positive project which will assure the investors safety of their investment (Shleifer&Vishny, 1997). In fact 
better-governed firms have better operating performance. Corporate governance (CG) is a way in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Irrespective 
of the particular definition, the importance of corporate governance arises in a firm because of the 
separation between those who control and those who own the residual claims (Epps &Cereola, 2008). 
Many stock exchange and regulators around the world are increasingly looking to ensure high standards 
of corporate governance to attract more capital or foreign investment to the country. For example, 
following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) proposed a new corporate 
governance listing-standard has been approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission SEC on 
November 4, 2003 (Kadan et al. 2009). The new listing standards include provisions regarding board 
composition and structure, audit committee composition and responsibilities and other corporate 
governance matters.  
 
Theoretical frame work, review of Literature and development hypothesis 
 
Fig-1.  Research Model of the study 
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Specifically, this paper is aimed to identify the influence of two corporate governance elements to 
firm performance. To do so two main characteristics of corporate governance were selected include: 
independent non-executive and audit committee. This study is interested in measuring the performance of 
Malaysian companies on how corporate governance influence firm performance by the used of two 
financial ratios Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings per Share (EPS). If good corporate governance is in 
place, it means there is a good board oversight of the management of the company. This would in turn 
ensure the company improves its performance. However, would that also mean that weak corporate 
governance leads to weak performance? 
 
2. Independent variables (Corporate Governance) 
  
For the purpose of this study two independent variables are: 
 
2.1 Independent non-executive directors: 
Independent non-executive directors are described as the “mainstay of good governance” 
(Editorial, 2003, p. 287), non-executive directors are also considered to be a guarantee of the integrity and 
accountability of company boards. An independent non-executive director is also defined as independent 
directors who have no affiliation with the firm except for their directorship (Clifford and Evans, 1997). 
There is an apparent presumption that boards with significant outside directors will make different and 
perhaps better decisions than boards dominated by insiders.  
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2000) recommends, as a best practice, that there 
needs to be balance on the board of directors with at least one third of the board members should be 
independent directors. This is to ensure the effectiveness of the independent directors in maintaining the 
objectivity in board decisions. The argument for the need of independent non-executive directors on the 
board substantiated from the agency theory which states that due to the separation between ownership and 
control, managers (given the opportunity) would tend to pursue their own goals at the expense of the 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).Hence, by having independent non-executive directors on the 
board, these directors would help to monitor and control the opportunistic behaviour of management, and 
assist in evaluating the management more objectively.  
 
H0: Number of independent non-executive directors not influences firm performance. 
Ha: Number of independent non-executive directors influence firm performance. 
 
2.2 Audit Committee 
Audit Committees (“Audit Committee”) are recognized as the cornerstone of a successful and 
credible financial reporting system. DeZoort et al. (2002: 41) define an effective audit committee as 
follows: “An effective audit committee has qualified members with the authority and resources to protect 
stakeholder interests by ensuring reliable financial reporting, internal controls, and risk management 
through its diligent oversight efforts.” However, numerous factors affecting the performance of audit 
committees need to be addressed in order to optimise their effectiveness and achieve their objectives. To 
improve the performance of audit committees and identify inefficiency and opportunities in order to 
enhance effectiveness, audit committees should adopt global best practices in meeting their financial 
oversight and governance responsibilities (Leblanc Diagnostics 2005: 6). 
 
H0: Number of audit committee not influence firm performance. 
Hb: Number of audit committee influence firm performance.  
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3.  Research Design and Methodology 
3.1 Research design and sample 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the influence of two corporate governance 
components and firm performance within the Malaysian corporate governance setting. Thus, this study 
uses quantitative methods. To do so, this study focuses on the Bursa Malaysia databases where data are 
obtained from annual reports of Malaysian PLCs, based on the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index(as measured 
by market capitalization) between 2009 to 2011.  813 companies selected for analysis in this study were 
among the biggest companies in Malaysia; they are also recognisable in terms of their performance. The 
threeyear period chosen will also provide additional insight into firm performance which possibly affects 
the company’s performance during the world economic crisis. The selection of sample used in this study 
is similar to other corporate governance studies (i.e.,Abdullah, 2004; Levrau & Van den Berghe, 2007; 
Van Ees et al., 2008). 
4. Measurement procedures 
 
4.1 Corporate governance 
This study use two variables in place of corporate governance components, i.e. audit committee and 
composition of NEDs, in line with many corporate governance studies (Levrau & Van den Berghe, 2007; 
Van Ees et al., 2008; Awan, 2012). First, we calculated the number of audit committee in the data set. 
Second, we measured we classified each director as either an executive (inside) director or a nonexecutive 
(outside) director. This allowed us to calculate the percentage of outsiders on each board.  
 
4.2 Firm performance 
Although there are many measures of firm performance, this study followed the predominant 
approach and used two financial measures of firm performance, Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings 
per share. Financial measures of firm financial performance fit into accounting-based measures.  
Examples used in the governance literature include ROA and ROE (Rahman & Haniffa, 2006, Haron et 
al., 2008; Awan, 2012), In general, the major concern with accounting measures is that they are historical 
and so lag the actual actions that bring about the results. As well as this is a common measure used in the 
literature.  
 
5. Data Analysis 
 
The annual reports of the companies that were downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia Website have 
been entered into a database. The files were then exported into a SPSS file for further analysis. This study 
employs descriptive and parametric statistical analysis. Since the hypotheses predict the non-directional 
of correlation, we employed two-tail significant tests. In order to test the hypotheses, Spearman’s 
correlation matrix was employed. The Spearman’s correlation was to identify the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance.  
5.1 Results and discussions 
5.1.1 Independent Non-Executive Directors has an influence on Firm Performance 
The analysis of Spearman’s correlation matrix is conducted to find the influenceindependent non-
executive directors on firm performance reported to be mixed (Table 1). At significant level .05, the 
relationships were not significant for 2009, 2010 and 2011 for ROE with r = .102, .097 and .102 (p = 
.093, .110 and .088 < 0.05). However, at significant level .01, in 2009, 2010 and 2011 independent non-
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executive directors influenced the EPS with r = .221, .259 and .243 (p = .000, .000 and .000). This result 
confirms with previous study which revealed an inconsistence influence between independent directors   
and firm performance (Abor & Adjasi, 2007; Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006). The positive effect can 
be explained because  the presence of outside independent directors on boards enhanced corporate 
competitiveness and provided new strategic outlooks for the firms (Abor & Adjasi, 2007). By 
emphasizing the potential for divergence of interests between investors and managers, agency theorists 
predict that where board of directors is more independent of management and enhance the auditing 
system of the companies (Salleh et al.,2005), and finally increased  company performance would be 
higher.On the contrary to the fact that there is noinfluence of the two independent and dependent 
variables can be resulted on the arguments that have limited time to involve in company operation 
(Conger & Lawler, 2009). As a whole the result of the influence of independent non-executive directors 
on firm performance among Malaysian companies is mixed. Therefore, the hypothesis (Ha) is accepted. 
 
Table (i) Hypothesis-1. Independent Non-Executive Directors and Firm Performance 
Firm Performance variable Corporate governance 
variable 
2009 2010 2011 
R Sig. R Sig. R Sig. 
Return on Equity Independent Non-Exec. Dir. .102 .093 .097 .110 .104 .088 
Earnings per Share Independent Non-Exec. Dir. .221
**
 .000 .259
**
 .000 .243
**
 .000 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
5.1.2 Audit committee has influence on firm performance. 
The results of Spearman’s correlation matrix are conducted to find the influence of the audit 
committee and firm performance reported mixed results (Table 2). The relationships was not significant 
for 2009, 2010 and 2011 for ROE with r = .108, .055 and .117 (p = .075, .365 and .117 < 0.05). However, 
in 2009, 2010 and 2011 audit committee was significant for EPS with r = .210, .282 and .249 (p = .000, 
.000 and .000 < 0.01). However, ROE was not significant for audit committee in 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected and it is concluded that effective audit committee result in 
higher performance, accepting the alternative hypothesis (Hb). 
Indeed, the size of the audit committee could be an indication of the seriousness attached to issues of 
transparency by the organization and this sends the right signal to the public who then develops 
confidence in the organization. Again, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) indicates that there is the tendency 
for large firms to make accounting choices which reduces the probability of regulatory scrutiny and also 
cite other literature documenting the penchant for firms to make accounting choices aimed at smoothing 
out reported income. In this circumstance, the presence and to some extent the size of the audit committee 
is an assurance mechanism to promote fairness.  
Also, it has been argued by Menon and Williams (1994) that for audit committees to be effective 
monitors, it is not enough just to be independent and that they must be active (measured by the frequency 
of their meetings). On the audit committee, this shows that the hypothesis is supported, contrary to the 
study of Anthony Kyereboah-Coleman. (2007) who relatively found that there is no positive influence in 
a number of audit committee to firm performance. 
 
Table (ii) Hypothesis-2. Testing for Audit committee and Firm Performance 
Firm Performance 
variable 
 
Corporate governance variable 
2009 2010 2011 
R Sig. R Sig. R Sig. 
Return on Equity Audit committee .108 .075 .055 .365 .095 .117 
Earnings per Share Audit committee .210
**
 .000 .282
**
 .000 .249
**
 .000 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
 
Idris Adamu Alhaji; Maryam Ismaila Baba; Wan Fauziahbt Wan Yusoff 
112 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this studyis to identify the influence of corporate governance on firm performance. 
Two hypotheses were developed and tested each variable to identify the influence of each of the corporate 
governance variables (Independent non-executive directors, and audit committee) in relation to two 
performance indicators (ROE and EPS). The significance of one of CG aspects, namely board 
characteristics. In general, the results show that investors consider good governance practices are more 
important in their investment decisions. This implies the significance of good corporate governance has 
an influence on firm performance. The findings are also backed for the hypotheses connecting board 
characteristic variables and firm performance. Good corporate governance was found to moderate many 
influence of theboard's characteristics to firm performance. It was discovered that no single theory offers 
a complete explanation of boards characteristics-firm performance relationship, but rather elements of 
each theory can be seen to apply in different circumstances. Therefore, the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights remains a key issue in Malaysia as controlling shareholders exercise dominant 
control via ownership concentration and representation on company board and management. However, 
we should consider the limitations of this study because the small sample size and a special industry may 
not render the results of the study to be generalized. In addition, the duration of study should be more than 
three years because the effect of independent variables will be during subsequent periods. 
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